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Abstract 
During the Cold War, the inherent mistrust between the United States and the 
Soviet Union kept the two superpowers from cooperating even on many projects that 
might have proven mutually beneficial. Nevertheless, they were willing to work together 
at least occasionally; two such examples are the neutralizations of Austria (in 1955) and 
of Laos (in 1962). Despite very different world orders in those two countries at those 
times, the weaker superpowers in each contest, the Soviets in Austria and the Americans 
in Laos, took very similar actions. They followed the same three-stage process from the 
outbreak of the dispute to its negotiated conclusion. 
 This process failed, however, in Vietnam. In trying to explain why neutralization 
failed so soon after its success, this thesis postulates a number of possible explanations. 
Ultimately, it was several factors coming to result in the failure of neutralization in 
Vietnam. 
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Introduction 
The only two national neutralizations successfully negotiated by the superpowers 
during the course of the Cold War were those of Austria and Laos.1 On the surface, the 
events that led to the treaties guaranteeing these neutralizations differed greatly. The 
Austrian State Treaty was signed in 1955 after a decade of occupation by Western and 
Soviet troops. The signing of the treaty in May of that year capped an agonizingly slow, 
and frequently stalled, process of negotiation. In Laos, however, civil war raged 
intermittently from 1954 to the signing of the neutralization agreements in 1962. 
Moreover, the talks themselves went relatively quickly once they were started, and there 
was no long-term procrastination of the sort that had happened in Austria. The end result 
in both countries, however, was the same. Both Austria and Laos entered into 
international agreements with the superpowers that pacified them and placed them 
beyond the reach of the various alliances and blocs. For the remainder of the Cold War, 
they would remain outside both the American and Soviet spheres of influence. 
 During the decades of American involvement in Vietnam, however, this 
pacification and neutralization never took place, despite several similarities to the crises 
in Austria and Laos. This has been blamed on a number of causes over the years: 
hawkishness on the part of President Lyndon Johnson or other American officials, a 
failure by the Diplomatic Corps in Washington to fully understand the political situation 
in Southeast Asia, or perhaps simply an inevitable ignition of the Cold War. A study of 
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this failure of neutralization in Vietnam and of its successes in Austria and Laos reveals 
that while neutralization might have been possible during the Kennedy administration, its 
likelihood was significantly reduced under President Johnson. The assassination that 
initiated his presidency came at the worst possible time for peace in Vietnam. 
 This paper is divided into two sections. The first describes a three-stage 
neutralization process that took place both in Austria and Laos. While outwardly the two 
countries appear very different, the diplomatic decisions mirrored each other in a number 
of ways and provide a framework to understand the neutralization process. In the second 
section, this three stage framework will be applied to the conflict in Vietnam. In theory, 
the Johnson Administration had a workable design to impose on their greatest foreign 
policy crisis. This paper will attempt to answer the question of why that framework was 
never fully applied. 
 
The Three-Stage Neutralization Process 
 A thorough examination of the events leading up to the signing of the treaties that 
neutralized Austria and Laos reveals a number of similarities in the measures taken prior 
to neutralization, specifically, between the actions and situations of the Soviet Union in 
Austria and of the United States in Laos. The most important of these is that each was 
operating in its respective theater from a position of weakness relative to the other 
superpower. The USSR never had much support in Austria; acting through the Austrian 
Communist Party, its allies never managed to secure the kind of power base they would 
need in order to dictate the terms of the negotiations. Consequently, they were reluctant 
to make any changes to the political status quo in Europe, having little chance of securing 
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Austria for the Eastern Bloc. Similarly, in Laos, the United States found itself backing the 
weaker party, the rightist force in the ongoing civil war. A combination of a weak support 
base and a large military disadvantage (due partly to support of the opposition by the 
North Vietnamese) meant that any long-term agreement in Laos would be unlikely to 
leave the country in the Western Bloc. Thus, the Soviets in Austria and the Americans in 
Laos were the weaker superpower, and will be referred to as such throughout the paper.* 
 These weaker powers followed similar courses of actions in very different 
situations. They began with similar goals, which gradually adjusted along closely parallel 
paths as the situations changed. Despite a wide gulf in ideologies and remarkably 
different political situations in the nations in question, a similar script was followed 
closely by the weaker power in both cases. 
 In the first of these stages, the weaker superpower attempted to determine the 
strength of its support in the country in question. This could consist of a number of 
actions, from the entirely legitimate – such as backing candidates and canvassing for 
support – to the blatantly illegal – such as buying off voters and attempting to stage 
coups. While the exact actions varied, they consistently tended to become more overt as 
time went on. Eventually – after a final gambit demonstrated to the weaker power that it 
lacked the leverage to impose its will in the region in dispute, the process moved on to 
stage two. 
 In the second stage of the neutralization process, the weaker powers attempted to 
minimize their losses. Realizing the country in question would not enter the orbit of the 
weaker power, the superpower tried to salvage a benefit from its presence in the country. 
                                                 
* “Weaker Superpower” and “Weaker Power” will be used interchangeably; in both cases, these refer to the 
Soviets in Austria and the Americans in Laos when describing the process in general terms. 
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While negotiations may have taken place, these were not true efforts at diplomacy, but 
rather attempts to stall for time. During this stage, the superpower had two main options: 
dividing the country into two and giving one half to each bloc, or putting the country into 
a coalition of neutrals to make sure its neutrality would be the “right kind”, that is, one 
that did not threaten the weaker power. A third option, escalation, was also considered if 
it was politically viable. When these plans also collapsed, the process entered Stage 
Three. 
 In the third stage of the neutralization process, the weaker power accepted that the 
country in question was going to be, at best, neutral favoring the other side. The weaker 
superpower utilized the ongoing dispute to de-escalate tension on an international scale 
and enter into genuine negotiations. The most divisive issues of earlier years by this time 
had answers that were much clearer to the weaker power, and the negotiated neutrality 
was hailed as a victory (of sorts) for Cold War diplomacy. 
 
Stage One: Introduction 
 In the first stage of the neutralization process, the weaker power tried to determine 
how much influence it carried within the country in dispute. The Soviets in Austria 
investigated the prospects for creating a “worker’s paradise” in the Alps. The Americans, 
similarly, hoped that the staunch anti-communism they favored in Laos could take hold. 
The superpowers’ discovery method was simply to test their strength by exerting it. In 
both of these nations, the superpower first tried to apply power relatively subtly – by 
backing candidates, or pushing for overthrows. Following this (unsuccessful) political 
phase, there was an aggressive phase. The frustrated weaker power moved on to more 
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open (and less internationally acceptable) methods: the Soviets tried a series of uprisings, 
while the Americans backed the rightist side in a civil war. Eventually, the weaker 
powers realized that they lacked the leverage to force their will on these nations and the 
process moved on to Stage Two. 
For all the similarities between the two nations, it is important to note that while 
there were widespread concerns of a third World War being set off by any armed conflict 
in Europe, the same cannot be said of Southeast Asia. In all stages, any action could 
generally be carried much further in Laos, located in the periphery, than in Austria, 
placed centrally along the fault line in Central Europe. This was especially true in the 
second stage of the process, but contributed in the first stage to the presence of an 
ongoing civil war in Laos. There was never a realistic chance of anything comparable 
happening in Austria. 
 
Stage One: Austria 
 In Austria, the first stage of the neutralization process began with the end of 
World War Two and the Four Power occupations of Germany and Austria. It lasted until 
the failure of the Communist uprising in Austria in September and October of 1950. 
During this stage, Stalin and his ministers still seemed to have some hope that Austria 
might join the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe by forming a Communist government 
under the control of Moscow. The first few years were spent gauging their support among 
the electorate using the legal political process, through the Austrian Communist party, 
and resulted in a resounding failure. A series of what have been described alternately as 
“strikes” and “putsches” followed; these were no more successful. After five years of 
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frustration and failure, the Soviets realized that they had little leverage in Austria, and 
moved on to stage two. 
 It is important to note that the intentions of the Soviet Union towards Austria 
during the first five years of occupation are still largely uncertain. Certain scholars, such 
as Audrey Kurth Cronin, have argued persuasively that the Soviet actions taken from 
1945-1950 in Austria were part of a deliberate attempt to seize the country for the Eastern 
Bloc.2 On the other hand, Günter Bischof, perhaps more representative of the balance of 
recent scholarship, has insisted that, “The Soviet Union never tried to take over Austria 
and incorporate it into its post-war empire.”3 The debate is clearly not yet closed. 
Ironically, American onlookers at the time of the uprisings may have sided with Bischof; 
American High Commissioner for Austria Walter Donnelly did not seem to regard the 
uprisings, in and of themselves, as a particular threat.4 
 The first free elections held in Austria since the rise of fascism in that country 
were conducted on November 25, 1945.5 Expectations were that the communists would 
do relatively well; American estimates were roughly ten to twenty percent, while those of 
the Communists themselves ranged from twenty-five to thirty percent.6 The results 
proved disastrous for the Communist party: only 5.42%, less than 175,000 votes. With 
only four seats in Parliament, and one very minor cabinet post (Minister of 
Electrification) that served only to counter claims of bias, the party would have only 
token representation and thus no effective power in the government.7 In no one region did 
they poll particularly well; in Vienna and Carinthia, their strongest showings, they still 
only managed eight percent. The Communists then turned their attention to the trade 
unions, hoping that they could build up support that would transfer to national elections. 
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They campaigned extremely heavily, and it paid off to some extent; they had a strong 
showing in the industrial province of Styria.8 Accompanied by a new public relations 
campaign, the elections of 1949 followed these local gains, but the Communists achieved 
only token success. They marginally increased their votes (to 213,000, though more 
voters were eligible than in the previous election) and received one additional seat in 
parliament.9 Following this latest disaster, the Soviets abandoned hope of achieving 
victory in Austria through election; they turned to riskier methods. 
 The Austrian Communist Party staged the first street demonstrations in May of 
1947, shortly before their counterparts in Hungary took control of that country.10 
Intending to incite a general strike and occupy the office of the Chancellor, the Austrian 
Communists failed completely; the unions refused to cooperate and the American 
Military Police quelled the mob. Later that year, the Austrian Communist Party tried to 
convince several of the more jittery members of the (non-Communist) Socialist party to 
sign a separate state treaty with the Soviets. This also failed, when word of the plan 
leaked to the anti-Communist People’s Party Foreign Minister, Karl Gruber, who in turn 
leaked it to the press.11 In 1948, Marshall Plan aid began to flow into Austria, and the 
discontent that had fueled what little success the Communists had achieved so far began 
to dwindle. 
 The final uprising staged by the Communists occurred in the fall of 1950. The 
outbreak of the Korean War in the summer of 1950 caused a worldwide spike in the price 
of consumer goods, and Austria was not immune to this increase in costs.12 Food prices 
shot up, without a similar rise in wages, and negotiations began between the government 
and representatives of the workers to try to correct the imbalance and remedy the food 
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shortage that was developing. These talks dragged on until late September, and 
dissatisfaction began to grow among the working populace. The Communists seized on 
this situation as an opportunity to win over support for their cause. With the unexpected 
announcement on September 23 that the negotiations had been completed (though no 
details were forthcoming), the Communist press insisted that the workers had been 
betrayed and called for a series of strikes. Though the uprising was at first supported by 
many of the rank and file Socialists, and numbered as many as 120,000 workers, it 
originated with the Communist minority in the unions. While the Soviet troops present in 
the city did help the strikers both by providing logistical aid and interfering with the 
police, they were careful never to violate the terms of the occupation openly. On 
September 26, starting in those districts in the Soviet zone of occupation which were 
most sympathetic to Marxism, the strike spread throughout Vienna, and on to other 
industrial cities such as Linz. Strikers seized control of some local buildings, and a few 
officials were injured. The Austrian government, under Leopold Figl, panicked, and the 
Austrian police proved inept at dealing with the mob.13 The strike began to lose 
momentum by September 27, however, and by the next day most of the workers had 
returned to work. A second wave of strikes broke out the following week, on October 3, 
accompanied by rumors of Red Army troops massing on the Czechoslovakian border. 
The rumors proved unfounded, and this second wave eventually petered out as well. 
Austria, seemingly, did not and would not succumb to pressure from the Soviets. The 
best that the USSR could hope for now was to keep Austria out of the American sphere. 
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Stage One: Laos 
 The major players within Laos were two former allies who polarized the conflict 
in that country around them. Prince Souvanna Phouma, usually referred to as Souvanna, 
was the elected Prime Minister, and a left leaning, though non-Communist neutralist. His 
opponent, Phoumi Nosovan, usually referred to as Phoumi, was a right-wing General and 
close ally of the United States. While there were other players in the conflict, such as the 
determined neutralists Kong Le and Phoui Sananikone, the conflict eventually became a 
battle between the military forces of – and ideologies behind – Souvanna and Phoumi. 
Within Washington, however, the Laos crisis had its roots firmly planted in 
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s presidency; the conflict reached its zenith shortly before he left 
office. The entirety of the first stage took place during his two terms, as his 
administration tried to install a pro-Western government in Vientiane; Eisenhower’s 
departure marks the transition point between the first and second stages. As in Austria, 
the first stage of Laotian neutralization can be divided into two phases. During the initial, 
political phase, beginning in 1958, the United States (acting primarily through the CIA) 
replaced Prime Minister Souvanna with General Phoumi, in a dizzying series of coups 
and counter-coups. The overthrow of Phoumi himself in 1960 set off the second, military 
phase. The deposed rightist leader raised an army and began a civil war in Laos that 
threatened to engulf all of Southeast Asia. It was not until the weakness of Phoumi’s 
army compared with the Communist Pathet Lao became apparent that American officials 
began to realize that they needed to change tactics.14 
 The origin of the conflict in Laos stretches back to the early days of French 
colonialism in Southeast Asia, but a more convenient starting point for purposes of this 
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paper is the Geneva Conference of 1954. Following the defeat of French forces at Dien 
Bien Phu, a treaty was signed guaranteeing, among other things, the independence and 
neutrality of Laos. It also provided for the “integration” of independent armies (such as 
the Pathet Lao) into the Royal Laotian Armed Forces (usually abbreviated FAR).15 The 
Pathet Lao was also supposed to be represented in the government, and an International 
Control Commission (ICC) was formed to ensure that the treaty was followed properly. 
Many of the stipulations of the treaty dealing with internal political matters were worded 
so vaguely as to be unenforceable, however, and so disagreements began almost 
immediately.16 A genuine neutralist, Prince Souvanna Phouma, was installed as Prime 
Minister, but the Pathet Lao, along with its allies, was the most powerful bloc in the 
coalition government. Receiving aid directly from North Vietnam, the Communist forces 
remained strong in the northern part of the country, but were effectively contained 
there.17 In the summer of 1958, the United States delayed payments to Laos to bring 
about a parliamentary crisis, forcing Souvanna to retire as Prime Minister on July 23.18 A 
pro-Western centrist neutralist, Phoui Sananikone, followed.19 Phoui expelled the Pathet 
Laos’ political wing (the NLHX) from the government, and set about trying to secure his 
power base. On New Years Eve, 1959, however, the CIA-backed rightist General Phoumi 
Nosovan seized control of the government in a quick, bloodless action, following his 
dismissal from Phoui’s cabinet.20 Rigged elections followed in April of 1960. New rules 
virtually forbade any participation by the NLHX, CIA money was used openly to buy 
votes, and Phoumi’s CDNI was victorious.21 However, his base of support was far too 
narrow to sustain his administration, and his victory was short-lived. Phoumi was 
overthrown in August in a coup d’etat led by neutralist Captain Kong Le, who restored 
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Souvanna to office. The “quiet” phase of the American attempt to secure Laos had ended, 
and the more violent phase of the campaign was about to begin. 
Following Kong Le’s reinstatement of Souvanna, the restored Prime Minister 
opened negotiations with the Pathet Lao to form a coalition government.22 He also 
allowed the Soviet Union to open an embassy in Vientiane, the Laotian capital. The 
United States once again suspended payments to the Laotian government and issued a 
series of demands intended to minimize the power of the communists and restore Phoumi 
to a position of power.23 While he kept up a pretext of negotiation, Phoumi began to 
assemble an army, which by December was approaching Vientiane. American advisors 
by that time were also helping to fill the officer shortage in the Laotian army.24 On 
December 13, the battle began for the Laotian capital. American “military technicians” in 
civilian attire were already in Laos, and in the opening days of the renewed civil war, 
Eisenhower sent fighter-bomber aircraft in support of Phoumi as well.25 In its final days, 
the Eisenhower administration officially recognized Phoumi’s regime, and many Western 
powers followed his lead. The Communist Bloc, however, still saw Souvanna as the 
legitimate ruler. The civil war reached a climax of sorts at the Plain of Jars in Eastern 
Laos. The Pathet Lao, strengthened by a large contingent of experienced North 
Vietnamese Army regulars, routed Phoumi’s forces on March 9.26 The American-allied 
forces faced the prospect of crushing defeat, as the Leftist forces already controlled much 
of the country and were only getting stronger, while the inexperienced Royal Laotian 
army could accurately be called incompetent and unmotivated.27 It was against this 
backdrop of a rapidly deteriorating situation in Laos that President John F. Kennedy was 
inaugurated on January 20, 1961. 
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Stage One: Conclusion 
 During the first stage of the neutralization process in both Austria and Laos, the 
Americans and Soviets used comparable methods to determine whether they could bring 
the countries into their respective orbits. In each case, the superpower first investigated 
the prospects of establishing control in an essentially legal manner, before moving on to a 
more open grab for power. The Soviets, failing miserably to make any kind of showing in 
Austrian national elections, staged an uprising, hoping either to test the breadth of their 
support or possibly even effect a coup. The United States took advantage of an unstable 
political climate in Laos to force its candidate into high office, and – when he could not 
remain there – supported him more openly in a civil war. In both Austria and Laos the 
later moves could be seen as acts of desperation; as the initial attempts failed 
dramatically, the superpowers tried the most overt methods available to them. They were 
unsuccessful, however, and the process moved on to the next stage. 
 
Stage Two: Introduction 
 In the second stage of the neutralization process, the weaker power gave up hope 
for an outright victory (i.e., assimilation of the contested country into its bloc). They 
replaced it with hopes of getting some sort of consolation prize, either a neutrality that 
worked in their favor, or influence over at least a portion of the country. Plans of action 
generally fell into two categories: coalition and partition. As regards the former, the 
superpowers envisioned regional organizations of similarly-inclined neutrals, intended as 
buffers against aggression or infiltration by the other power. While none of these plans 
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were ever realized, they were major goals that the weaker powers abandoned only 
reluctantly. Regarding the latter course of action, the countries considered either formal 
or informal partition, dividing the nation in question into communist and capitalist states. 
This possibility was also eventually discarded, as the path to negotiation – and genuine 
neutrality- began to take shape. 
 
Stage Two: Austria 
 Following the failure of the putsch in late 1950, the Soviet leadership linked the 
fate of Austria increasingly closely with that of Germany. The political situation 
elsewhere in Western Europe was essentially settled; the defection in 1948 of Yugoslavia 
from the Soviets was the last major change, and Communist attempts to gain power in 
Italy and Greece had failed to keep them out of the American orbit. On the other side of 
the Iron Curtain, the uprisings in Eastern Europe were all crushed by the Soviets.  
The German question occupied the minds of many diplomats at that time. Both 
sides claimed that they wanted Germany neutral and unified, but the differences in Soviet 
and American demands for that neutrality were irreconcilable. Both sides in the debate 
feared the risks of a neutral Germany more than they desired the benefits. Because 
Austria was, on the surface, politically very similar to Germany (divided into several 
occupation zones), the Soviets feared that any compromise that they offered on Austria 
would be expected of Germany as well. The Kremlin hoped for a band of neutral buffer 
states stretching from Finland and Sweden through Germany, Austria, and Yugoslavia to 
the Adriatic Sea.28 This “band of neutrals,” preferably modeled after Finland (and thus 
friendly to the Soviet Union, though officially neutral), was supposed to inspire Western 
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countries to leave NATO. Such a plan was never realized, of course, but the Soviet 
leadership continued to press for it even in the late 1950’s.29 The disposition of Germany 
was critical to this plan, however, and thus it never reached fruition. 
 Following the death of Josef Stalin, there was a gradual warming of US-Soviet 
relations. Several openings for negotiation presented themselves. One such window of 
opportunity occurred during the brief reign, following Stalin’s death, of Lavrenti Beria, 
but the premier was arrested and executed before the opportunity could be exploited by 
the Western powers.30 Despite the instability following Stalin’s demise, however, 
progress was made in many disputes, most notably in the Korean peninsula - but Austria 
still proved an intractable problem. Soviet withdrawal of troops from the Alpine country 
was contingent on a peace treaty with Germany, which would not occur for decades.31 
Meanwhile, the Kremlin continued a variety of tactics to keep talks from continuing, such 
as insisting that they were conditional on settlement of the status of Trieste, or the 
resolution of Yugoslav claims on Austrian territory. During this time, from 1950 to 1954, 
a de facto partitioning of Austria was in effect, and was proving increasingly problematic 
to Moscow. Americans and their allies could use Western Austria to cross between 
Germany and Italy without repercussions, the Austrians were increasingly hostile to the 
Soviet occupying armies, and the cost of occupation was mounting. In the elections of 
1953, the Communists continued to lose ground even in Soviet-dominated sectors.32 
Finally, in February 1954, at the Berlin conference, talks resumed, albeit slowly. It was 
not until the following year that any substantial progress was made, but by then the 
Soviets had moved on to the third stage of the neutralization process. 
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Stage Two: Laos 
 The second stage of the neutralization process in Laos took much less time than it 
had in Austria; it began approximately January 20, 1961, with Kennedy’s inauguration, 
and was over by October of that year. Though the process unfolded much more quickly, 
the Kennedy administration considered a set of options in Laos remarkably similar to the 
choices the Soviets had in Austria. One option, highly favored by some in the White 
House, was to have Laos join in a Neutral Nations Commission with some of its rightist 
neighbors, to form a large bloc that could resist the “falling dominoes” of Communism. A 
partition of the country – essentially setting boundaries based on what land the Laotian 
Royal Army could hold on to – was considered fairly late in the proceedings as well, 
though it was never seen as anything other than a desperation move. Finally, one option 
that had never received significant consideration in Austria – use of overt military force – 
was briefly considered. The failure at the Bay of Pigs shattered Kennedy’s faith in armed 
intervention, however, and brought an end to serious consideration of that course of 
action in Laos.33 
 The suggestion that Laos might form a Neutral Nations Commission surfaced 
during the earliest days of the Kennedy presidency. In a report for Robert McNamara, the 
new Secretary of Defense, the Inter-Agency Task Force on Laos wrote “General Lines of 
Recommended Action”: 
“…we should see that a plan is put forward by the King of Laos for the creation 
of a commission comprised of Cambodia, Burma, and Malaya under the 
chairmanship of Prince Sihanouk, which will supervise the carrying out a plan of 
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action that has promise of being acceptable to other allied and neutral nations, 
should satisfy any legitimate international concern of the bloc to the future status 
of Laos, and gives evidence of achieving minimum U.S. objectives in Laos. This 
concept should be merged with the concept of the buffer zone proposed by the 
King of Cambodia to include Cambodia and Laos. This proposal should be put to 
our allies with request for their support in the most forceful possible way, making 
full use of the prestige and momentum of the new U.S. Administration.”34 
On February 19 the King of Laos, at the request of the United States, called on the 
neighboring nations to join with Laos in the creation of the commission. 35 Only the US 
and Britain pursued the offer; the Communist powers rejected it forcefully. Chinese 
officials declared the plan, “Part of an American scheme to turn Laos into a second 
Congo and a United States colony.”36 The following day, the Soviet Union declared that 
the King lacked the executive power to make such a request, and reiterated their stance 
that only Souvanna Phouma was the legitimate Prime Minister of Laos.37 Of the countries 
intended to compose the commission, only Malaya even considered the offer; Burma 
declined outright, and Cambodia deemed it “a unilateral proposition.”38 In a later meeting 
of the task force, it was decided that “for the Neutral Nations Commission proposal to 
have any chance of success, there had to be an element of strength.”39 As the military 
situation was bleak and looked only to get bleaker, the United States had no leverage to 
impose such a plan on unwilling opponents. The plan was effectively abandoned, and the 
Americans were looking more and more to the ICC by April 1. The Asian version of 
Europe’s proposed “Band of Neutrals” never materialized. 
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 Plans for partition, however, took longer to evaporate. While never proposed for 
open, public debate like the Neutral Nation Commission, a split of Laos was kept as an 
option until negotiations were well underway. A de facto partition of Laos had taken 
place already as a result of the ongoing civil war, and a long-term arrangement (similar to 
Austria prior to 1955 or Germany throughout the Cold War) could easily be envisioned. 
Phoumi’s forces and their allies were stronger in the southern, panhandle part of the 
country, and American officials actually considered negotiating a formal division.40 On 
August 8, Presidential advisor Walt Rostow sent a memo including a detailed description 
of the benefits and risks of partition to General Maxwell Taylor. One of the chief 
drawbacks raised was that such an arrangement would increase Viet Cong infiltration into 
South Vietnam, already a serious problem.41 While a contingent of officials (especially 
Frederick Nolting, the new Ambassador to Vietnam) continued to push for partition, 
enthusiasm for the idea had died down in the administration by the end of the summer.42 
By September, due to the dangerous escalations in Berlin and Cuba, Kennedy officials 
were more concerned with bringing about a negotiated settlement, and had entered the 
next stage of the neutralization process. 
 Escalation was never a viable option for the USSR in Europe; any attempt by 
Soviet forces to drive the Westerners out of Austria might have sparked a third world 
war. In Laos, however, American officials reserved it as a possible final action 
throughout this second stage, when it looked like it might be the one course of action that 
could keep the country from being lost entirely. Fred I. Greenstein and Richard H. 
Immerman argued in a 1992 article that while Eisenhower made a point of raising the 
possibility to Kennedy, he stopped far short of endorsing it unreservedly.43 Rather, he 
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seemed to prefer intervention only to the total loss of Laos to the Communists, an act 
which the outgoing President saw as the “cork in the bottle” to the absorption of all of 
Southeast Asia into the Communist Bloc. Intervention (preferably through SEATO) was 
considered alongside the other alternatives prior to the end of April, 1961.44 By April 26, 
however, Kennedy and his advisors had agreed that Laos was not worth the risks of 
military intervention, even if it would be lost entirely otherwise.45 This argument was 
probably in large part a response to the failure, earlier in the month, at the Bay of Pigs in 
Cuba; Kennedy was unwilling to risk a second such disaster.46 Additionally, pressure in 
the international community had begun to build by that time for a cease-fire. While the 
defense department continued to show support for intervention, Kennedy had essentially 
abandoned the path towards escalation, and the administration policy was to try to enact a 
real cease-fire in Laos.47 
 
Stage Two: Conclusion 
 The second stage of the neutralization was essentially bounded by two events. 
This stage began with the failure to secure victory, while the initiation of genuine 
negotiation concluded it, brought on by a major concession by the weaker power. During 
this stage, a number of plans were introduced to try to secure “victory without victory.” A 
coalition of neutrals gave the Soviets hope for a “Finlandization” of Austria, and the 
Americans a vision of a “Thailand in Laos.” Similarly, partition, whether negotiated or 
simply accepted, held the promise of retaining at least part of the country for the weaker 
superpower. As a final option, while the Americans could consider the invasion of Laos, 
the Soviets could never realistically consider the same tactics in Austria.48 With the 
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chance for any sort of real victory having slipped away, the weaker superpowers moved 
on to the one option that at least avoided losing the whole of the country to the other bloc: 
negotiating neutralization. 
 
 
Stage Three: Introduction 
 The final stage of the neutralization process consisted primarily of negotiation; by 
the time that this step was reached, most of the major issues separating the two sides had 
been resolved. In the case of Austria, the Soviets first had to realize that the Central 
European country would never willingly be a Marxist state, and that they could not force 
it to become so. Additionally, the Soviets realized that neither could their dream of a 
“band of neutrals” be realized, as West Germany was firmly in the embrace of the West. 
In Laos, the Americans had to recognize that they could not keep Souvanna Phouma out 
of power and that best they could hope for was neutrality. The sort of Western-allied 
neutral status they had enjoyed with countries like Thailand was not possible in Laos. 
Whether it was due to residual resentment of the French, genuine sympathy with 
Communist powers, or a combination of these, the Laotian people did not support the 
leaders of the pro-Western faction. Once this final stage began, true neutrality was 
inevitable; the weaker power finally accepted that victory was unattainable and 
compromise was necessary to avoid total defeat. 
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Stage Three: Austria 
For nearly two years following Stalin’s death, no progress was made towards an 
Austrian state treaty. Suddenly, on February 8, 1955, Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav 
Molotov made an announcement that the USSR had “de-linked” the signing of the treaty 
from the German question.49 While this came as a shock to American diplomats, the 
events of the intervening years had made such a dramatic change in policy much easier 
for the Soviets. The most important of these probably was West German entry into 
NATO. With that country’s ratification of the Paris agreements in October of 1954, there 
was no real reason to continue to link Austria’s fate to West Germany’s. There was no 
longer a reasonable chance that Germany could be united and neutralized, and Austria 
was being held hostage to a now anachronistic idea, the prospect of a vast neutral buffer 
zone dividing Europe. Additionally, Austria had changed from a Soviet asset to a 
liability, for a number of reasons.50 The soldiers the USSR had stationed there were in an 
exposed position, not easily defensible. By withdrawing to the Czechoslovakian and 
Hungarian borders, and enacting the removal of American troops as well, the Soviets had 
an easy attack route towards Western Europe should the need arise. True Austrian 
neutrality also meant that NATO forces had to fly around the country, rather than (as they 
were doing at the time) over it. Additionally, Austria was no longer making money for 
the Soviets; the cost of occupation exceeded any of its financial benefits. Finally, the 
Soviets were no longer concerned that they might be abandoning a group of fellow 
Marxists (as in Hungary or Czechoslovakia); even the minimal support the Communist 
party had at that time was drying up. The Soviets decided, for these reasons, to use 
Austria to try and reduce the growing international tension of the Cold War. 
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Deborah Welch Larson’s 1987 article, “Crisis Prevention and the Austrian State 
Treaty,” contends that the Soviet decision to “unlink” Austria and Germany’s fates was 
part of a coordinated series of actions intended specifically to reduce tension between the 
superpowers.51 This process, called GRIT (for Graduated Reciprocation in Tension 
Reduction) called for a series of unilateral steps taken by one of the powers with the 
express purpose of encouraging (though not requiring) the other power to act in kind. 
Larsen contends that the process was initiated by Malenkov shortly after Stalin’s death, 
and continued under Khrushchev. Such a theory goes a long way toward explaining why 
the change in policy was so sudden; the Soviets were making a public attempt to signal 
change. Faced with an opponent who was actively pushing for peace, the Americans 
risked becoming the obstructionist party if they did not follow the Soviet lead. 
Furthermore, if the Americans appeared to be doing anything that might extend the 
occupation, it would have caused a serious rift between themselves and the Austrian 
people. Now that the last major obstacle to Austrian statehood had been cleared, 
negotiations proceeded relatively rapidly. Almost ten years of occupation and obstructed 
negotiations came to an end, and the treaty was signed May 15, 1955.52 
 
Stage Three: Laos 
 The first serious movement towards a break in hostilities in Laos began on April 
5, 1961 with a proposal from Sir Frank Roberts, Britain’s ambassador in Moscow, to the 
Soviet Union for a cease-fire and renewed negotiations.53 Unlike the excruciatingly slow 
negotiations in Austria, there was a general desire by all parties in the Laos crisis to get 
the conference going quickly. Additionally, there was no major issue such as the fate of 
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Germany to serve as a roadblock in the path to negotiation. There were some differences 
in the positions of the two parties that had to be overcome, however. The first of these 
was the makeup of the Laotian government and the placement of the major players 
(especially Phoumi and the Pathet Lao) within it. The second was the nature of the cease-
fire, which proved to be much easier to negotiate than implement. Like the Soviets in 
Austria, the Americans essentially conceded on every major point, preferring to sacrifice 
victory for stability. 
 While Deborah Welch Larson made a brief mention of Laos in her consideration 
of GRIT theory’s application in Austria, she never tried to apply the theory to the 
neutralization of the Asian nation.54 The theory does seem applicable, however, 
especially in comparison with the alternative model presented, reciprocity, during which 
a process of give and take continues until compromise is reached. Once the Kennedy 
administration had decided on a course of action, the neutralization of Laos was 
accomplished almost without exception by unilateral concessions on the part of the 
Americans. Both of the major obstacles on the path to neutralization were resolved in this 
manner: the Americans never really received anything in return for what they gave up 
except for the benefits of relaxed tension and peace. 
 The nature of the neutral Laotian government was probably the most difficult and 
divisive issue; American unwillingness to accept Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister 
had been driving the civil war since 1959. Additionally, US officials were very unwilling 
to approve a Laotian government that included any Communist presence, fearing that 
Marxists would eventually come to dominate the country. In the last days of the 
Eisenhower administration, Secretary of State Christian Herter expressed the opinion that 
  
23
“the introduction of Communist members into the Laotian government would 
undoubtedly lead to subversion of the government, and the ultimate replacement of a 
coalition government with a communist government.”55 While Eisenhower expressed 
some doubt, many officials in his and Kennedy’s administrations thought that if there was 
any communist representation in Souvanna’s government, the Marxist faction would 
inevitably attempt to seize power. The Americans eventually conceded on both 
governmental issues. Souvanna’s future as head of the government in Laos was 
ultimately the least divisive of these. As early as March 10, Llewellyn Thomson, US 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union, raised the possibility of accepting the Prince as 
government head, if American allies could be persuaded to accept him.56 By early April, 
while some officials were still looking for other candidates, and others simply did not 
trust Souvanna, the administration had warmed to the possibility.57 By November, 
Kennedy was willing to tell Khrushchev, “It is now clear that Prince Souvanna Phouma 
will become the new Prime Minister.”58 The presence of Communists in the government 
was closely related to this; many officials saw no way to have Souvanna as head of state 
without at least some Pathet Lao representation in his cabinet. In a move consistent with 
GRIT theory, however, Kennedy officials eventually allowed a “4-8-4” formula proposed 
by Prince Souvanna, consisting of four from the Pathet Lao, eight of Souvanna’s 
neutralists, and four from Phoumi’s group.59 By November, 1961, the United States had 
conceded on most of the major obstacles to peace. 
 A precondition to the beginning of the conference had been the establishment of a 
genuine, verifiable cease-fire. Agreement was reached for a cessation of hostilities on 
May 12, 1961, and for talks to begin that same day (though they were postponed until 
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May 16).60 While much of the literature about the beginning of talks seems to give most 
of the credit to the Soviets for agreeing to the cease-fire, it becomes clear that the 
Americans probably had every right to withdraw due to the bad-faith nature of the 
armistice. Pathet Lao forces began attacking Royal Lao Army forces at Pa Dong on April 
22, well before the cease-fire, and continued their attacks until the city collapsed on June 
7, weeks after the cease-fire was enacted.61 While the American delegation briefly 
boycotted the conference, they returned without any change in the status quo, or 
guarantees against future actions. Despite later attacks, and the continued violation of the 
agreement, the Kennedy officials continued to negotiate. Had the American team been 
operating under a reciprocity, rather than GRIT, program, the boycott would have likely 
continued until the attacks ended. The Americans chose instead to take unilateral action 
to defuse tension. Following a long period of negotiation (spent mainly ironing out minor 
differences that were still in place), the process finally came to an end. On July 23, 1962, 
fourteen countries signed an agreement in Geneva that secured Laotian neutrality.62 
 
Stage Three: Conclusion 
 The final stage of the neutralization process was dominated by negotiation; there 
was little of the political excitement more characteristic of the earlier stages. The biggest 
change in stage three was an attitudinal one by the weaker power. In Austria, in 1955, the 
Soviet Union realized that a reduction in international tension was of more value to the 
communist bloc than anything they could still extract from Austria. Thus, they were 
willing to concede on many of the most divisive issues separating the two sides in the 
interest of showing their new willingness to work with the West. In Laos, the Americans 
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learned a similar lesson. Any attempt to try to “save” Laos from the communists was 
likely to come at a very high cost in lives. Thus, they had more to gain by defusing the 
situation by whatever means necessary rather than allowing it to deteriorate. 
 This change in attitude was accompanied by a change in strategy. Prior to the 
third stage, the weaker actors seemed to be operating on a reciprocal negotiating system; 
they were unwilling to make any sort of concession without an immediate response from 
the other party. The shift to the GRIT method was likely in part due to the presence of a 
new administration. While Austria’s uncertain fate began with Stalin, it was settled with 
Khrushchev; similarly, Laos collapsed under Eisenhower but was stabilized under 
Kennedy. 
 
The Failure of the Neutralization Process in Vietnam 
 This three-stage process provides a new framework for the study of the decisions 
that led to American involvement in the Vietnam War. The history of that conflict is far 
too complex to recount in detail here.63 Certain actions taken prior to the peak of the war 
and their relationship to what had happened before in Laos and Austria, however, provide 
a new explanation of what exactly went wrong for the Johnson administration. From this 
viewpoint, Vietnam can more accurately be deemed a failed neutralization attempt rather 
than a war of aggression. 
 The first stage of the neutralization process proceeded in Vietnam much as it had 
in Austria and Laos. From the establishment of a divided North and South Vietnam in 
1954 to the time that the government of the South essentially collapsed ten years later, 
Vietnam’s history closely resembled that of Laos.64 While the government of President 
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Ngo Dinh Diem in South Vietnam was much more stable than that of Laos’s Prince Bon 
Oum, at  least until Diem’s overthrow, the civil war that resulted from infiltration from 
North Vietnam into the South was starting to turn strongly in favor of the communist 
forces by 1963. In November of that year, American allies in South Vietnam, operating 
with the consent of President Kennedy, authorized a coup against Diem, resulting in the 
leader’s death.65 Diem had maintained a powerful, autocratic rule in his country since 
1954, but was increasingly alienating both his own people and the Americans. American 
leaders were also concerned that Diem might try to negotiate a separate peace with North 
Vietnam, thus defying the goals of the Kennedy administration.66 A series of weak 
leaders followed Diem; none had a particularly firm control over the country, and 
American advisors repeatedly helped to overthrow any leader who failed to display 
sufficient strength or anti-communist credentials. A growing number of American 
“advisors” were sent to Vietnam during this period, in an attempt to stave off the 
increasingly aggressive infiltration of South Vietnam by its northern neighbor. The 
American presence during this period would eventually be dwarfed by the troop presence 
of later years, however.67 By the spring of 1964, the weakness of Diem’s successors had 
become apparent, and officials in the Johnson Administration began to realize that the 
South Vietnam that they hoped for – a free and independent capitalist country, oriented 
towards the West – would probably never be realized. The American officials directing 
the war effort began to turn their attention more seriously towards neutralization. 
The second stage of the neutralization process in Vietnam lasted approximately 
from the spring of 1964 until the first months of 1965. At the beginning of this period, 
there was still hope for neutralization. American policy in Vietnam was more aggressive, 
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or at least more direct, than it had been in Laos, but the ostensible goal was still similar to 
that in Laos at a comparable time: to avoid losing South Vietnam to the communists. 
During this period, Johnson Administration officials still were avoiding direct diplomatic 
contact with the North Vietnamese, hoping to possess more leverage with which to 
negotiate whenever those talks took place.68 The Americans postponed sending any 
ground forces, hoping that the South Vietnamese forces might at least maintain the status 
quo and that the North’s resolve might lessen. The military situation in South Vietnam 
had deteriorated dramatically by August, however. As Fredrik Logevall puts it, “For 
American officials, the nightmare scenario was coming true: South Vietnam was falling 
apart.”69 Earlier that month, the Gulf of Tokin Resolution had passed nearly unanimously 
in Congress, giving Johnson greater freedom to retaliate militarily in Vietnam.70 By early 
1965, however, the strength of the Army of South Vietnam, as well as that of the 
Government, had eroded to the point that the Americans were faced with two choices: 
make whatever concession was needed to get to the conference table, or prolong the war 
by introducing American ground troops. On January 27, Presidential advisor McGeorge 
Bundy gave Johnson the “fork in the road” memo outlining those two choices, and urging 
the initiation of “Phase II”: direct action against the North Vietnamese.71 It was at this 
time that the Johnson administration abandoned a potential path towards neutralization in 
favor of an option not taken either in Austria or Laos before it: escalation. 
The advocates of neutralization continued to campaign for their cause, even 
though they had essentially been defeated by that point. The first serious push towards 
neutralization had come in 1963 from French Prime Minister Charles de Gaulle.72 On 
August 29 of that year, de Gaulle delivered a statement urging a neutral solution to the 
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conflict in Vietnam. On November 3, the New York Times began advocating 
neutralization on its editorial page.73 In the first few months of 1964, de Gaulle renewed 
his call for neutralization, adding that China should be part of the negotiations.74 By the 
spring of that year, more newspapers and public figures were advocating negotiation than 
were endorsing escalation, chief among them Senators Wayne Morse of Oregon, Ernest 
Gruening of Alaska, and Mike Mansfield of Montana.75 In the summer, United Nations 
Secretary General U Thant began to push for neutralization, and was followed by a 
renewal of de Gaulle’s proposal.76 Publicly, there was widespread support for 
negotiation; had Johnson followed such a course of action he could claim the backing of 
a number of parties across the political spectrum. Johnson, however, not only ignored 
such advice, he at times banished those who advocated it from his presence.77 When the 
choice came to either escalate or negotiate in the early months of 1965, Johnson chose the 
former. 
It was at this point that the Johnson administration abandoned the path that might 
have eventually followed the three-stage neutralization model.78 He had continued the 
first stage of the model from Kennedy and taken it into the second during his short first 
term as President. Lyndon Johnson chose in the first weeks of his second term, however, 
not to continue along the path that Khrushchev had in Austria or Kennedy had in Laos.  
The remainder of this paper will attempt to explain why Johnson rejected 
neutralization in Vietnam. The first section will compare the three countries, and the 
actions of the United States within those countries, at their most decisive moments: 
Vietnam in 1965, Austria in 1955, and Laos in 1961. The second section will compare 
Lyndon Johnson’s White House in 1965 with the Kremlin in 1955 and Kennedy’s White 
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House in 1961. The goal of this final part of the paper is to explain why the Johnson 
administration was unwilling to make the kind of concession on the negotiating table that 
led to the final stage of neutralization in Austria and Laos. The examination will reveal 
that Johnson probably made his decisions based on simple political expediency. While it 
is clear now that Johnson’s actions did not serve his political interests in the long run, he 
probably thought that they were in his best political interests at the time.79 
 
 
The Political and Geographic Situation within Vietnam 
On the surface, the conflict in Vietnam that reached a crisis point under Johnson 
has many similarities both with Austria prior to 1955 and Laos prior to 1962. This was 
due in part to geographic and political parallels between Vietnam and the other two 
countries.  
Despite Vietnam’s geographical proximity to Laos, the political situation in the 
former country more closely resembled Austria’s in a number of ways. The partitioning 
and military occupation of Austria that followed the Second World War provided a fixed 
border between the Western and Soviet occupation zones that was analogous to the 1954 
division of Vietnam along the Seventeenth Parallel. Even as porous as this border was, it 
was still more stable than the fronts in the ongoing civil war in Laos. In both nations the 
stronger power was extremely dominant, while the weaker power had only token support 
and leaders who served at the behest of the superpowers.80 In Austria there was little 
doubt that the democratic system had more support and would provide the leadership for 
a unified, independent Austria when it existed. In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh clearly was the 
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dominant politician in the country who would emerge as the leader of a unified 
Vietnam.81 Vietnam also resembled Austria, rather than Laos, in the lack of a true 
consensus compromise neutralist leader like Souvanna Phouma in Laos. However, while 
Austria could overcome the absence of a Souvanna Phouma figure, Vietnam could not.  
The similarities between Vietnam and Laos were no less pronounced. The most 
important of these was that both nations were experiencing an ongoing civil war. This 
made the stakes potentially higher; while inaction in Austria on the part of the 
superpowers simply meant continuation of the status quo, any delay in action in Laos or 
Vietnam could benefit the communist forces. Additionally, in both countries, the terrain 
and climate were inherently unsuitable to waging war using established American 
methods. The populations of both Laos and Vietnam were largely agrarian, there were 
few major cities, and the terrain was inhospitable for tanks or large infantry formations. 
This made the prospects for a clean American military victory very slim; this was 
frequently noted by members of both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.82 
Finally, both countries were little-known in America and were located on the periphery of 
the contested territory in the Cold War. Unlike Austria or China, a failure in Indochina 
could potentially be “swept under the rug,” and not prove a major rallying point for an 
American president’s political enemies. 
 
American Policies in Vietnam 
In the early stages of the conflict in Vietnam, American decisions resembled those 
taken in Laos. Kennedy and Johnson administration officials repeated the conduct of the 
Eisenhower White House in attempting to seize on the instability of the government. In 
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Laos, that had meant installing Phoumi Nosovan and his allies in power, hoping to 
establish a secure, pro-western government. In Vietnam, the Americans began by backing 
the coup that eventually deposed Diem, replacing him with a series of leaders who were 
each, in turn, replaced themselves.83 The military presence - that of “advisors” – also 
more closely resembled the situation in Laos than it did that in Austria or elsewhere. 
Initially, there were not enough American troops in Vietnam to fight a war; for some 
time, their presence was small enough not to cause major political repercussions either in 
the region or in America.84 The end of this approach coincided with that of the end of the 
first stage of the neutralization process in Vietnam; as it became apparent that an anti-
communist regime could not survive under its own power in South Vietnam, the Johnson 
administration shifted its strategy.  
In the second stage of the neutralization campaign in Vietnam, President Johnson 
and his advisors more closely emulated Soviet actions in Austria; they recognized the 
weakness of their position politically and hoped time would take care of the difference. 
The Soviets, following the electoral disasters in Austria which gave them little leverage 
in the negotiations, essentially “sat out” on Austria from 1951-1954. There was no 
substantial movement diplomatically and the Soviet troop level was actually gradually 
reduced, and Soviet-American tensions began to ease, especially following Stalin’s death 
in March of 1953.85 In Vietnam, unlike Austria, total disengagement was the same as 
accepting a loss, however – had the American leadership elected to do nothing, the South 
Vietnamese would likely have been overrun by their counterparts from the north. What 
resulted in Vietnam, then, from the time the American allies began losing their grip (in 
1963, around the time of the coup against Diem) until the war expanded (in early 1965) 
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was the equivalent of the stall in Austria. The American leadership sent just enough 
troops to maintain the status quo and hoped that a better solution would eventually 
present itself.86 In this similarity – the main example of how the Kennedy and Johnson 
administrations tried to emulate earlier actions, the seeds were sown for the disaster that 
was to come. 
The strategy that the Americans took towards the South Vietnamese leadership – 
specifically, exercising direct control over the choice of leader – was even less effective 
in Vietnam than it had been in Laos. In the latter country, the goal had been to replace an 
unacceptable leader – someone over whom they had little or no influence – with their 
candidate of choice (namely Phoumi). In Vietnam, the leaders the Americans helped to 
overthrow had originally been their candidates of choice; the enemy parties were in 
Hanoi, not Saigon. The net effect of this sort of direct control over the government had 
been more effective in Laos; among other things, it was much clearer what the Americans 
sought by the series of coups and counter-coups, and the White House had consistently 
backed the same person (namely Phoumi). In Vietnam, however, it seemed more like a 
desperation move rather than any kind of strategy. Any time that Diem, Khanh, or any of 
their successors failed to entirely please the Americans, they were replaced. This gave the 
reasonable impression to much of the Vietnamese populace that anyone who held onto 
power was effectively a puppet of the Americans. 
Likewise, the stalling technique was not viable due to the ongoing civil war. In 
Austria, the Soviets could stall because nothing was happening that could cause the 
political situation in that country to drastically deteriorate. Once the possibility of gaining 
any substantial ground with the Austrian populace had slipped away, the continuing 
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economic growth of Austria, due to American Marshall Plan aid, gradually moved the 
Austrians further from, rather than closer to, the Soviets. The stall could continue 
indefinitely because the presence of Soviet troops was not likely to be jeopardized in the 
short term. In Vietnam, however, the situation was inherently unstable. Due to a 
combination of weak leadership in Saigon, successful infiltration of the countryside by 
the North Vietnamese, and the war-weariness of the Vietnamese populace, any refusal to 
negotiate on the part of the Americans was much more likely to endanger their cause than 
it was to help it.87 Soviet stalling had been based on the concept that any change in the 
situation was liable to make things worse for the Communist forces and their allies. What 
soon became clear in Vietnam is that the status quo was no more stable; the tenuous grip 
that the government held over the populace was growing weaker by the day. 
 
Johnson and His Predecessors 
 While there were political components in the neutralization of both Austria and 
Laos, they did not overwhelm the primary goal – neutralization - in those instances as 
they eventually did in Vietnam. There were four main political concerns for the new 
Johnson administration in late 1963 that did not exist, at least not to the same degree, for 
Khrushchev in 1955 in Austria or Kennedy in 1961 in Laos. The first of these was the 
legacy of John F. Kennedy; the circumstances of Johnson’s ascension to the Presidency 
handicapped his actions prior to his reelection in 1964. The second concern was the 
degree to which Vietnam dominated Johnson’s foreign policy. Austria and Laos had 
figured among many crises at the times of their neutralizations; Vietnam, however, 
clearly dominated Johnson’s foreign policy agenda. The third concern was the legacy of 
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the “loss” of China under a Democratic President; Johnson saw himself as much more 
vulnerable to appearing “weak” than either of his counterparts. The fourth concern was 
the legacy of Korea and the risk of inciting intervention by the Chinese, as had happened 
in late 1950; there were enough superficial similarities between Vietnam in 1963 and 
Korea in 1950 to cause alarm within the Johnson administration.88 These concerns did not 
exist in Austria at all, and in Laos the situation appeared to the casual observer to 
resemble a civil war, not an invasion, and the threat of Chinese intervention was much 
lower.  
 Lyndon Johnson had greater political limitations placed on his actions in Vietnam 
than his counterparts had in Austria or Laos. The first of these was simply the 
circumstance of his ascent to the presidency; any attempt to change policies radically 
might have been seen as politically disrespectful to his slain predecessor.89 Johnson was 
thus encouraged to allow the momentum of Kennedy’s policies to direct his actions. 
Kennedy also had more freedom of action in Vietnam than Johnson would have because 
of his foreign policy experience elsewhere; Johnson’s priorities generally had been with 
the domestic agenda, and many considered him “untried” in foreign affairs.90 This made 
it politically risky to try to initiate new policies overseas that conflicted with those of 
Kennedy.  
Unlike Kennedy, Johnson had to deal with Vietnam in something of a vacuum. 
Kennedy had faced a series of crises at the time of his inauguration, all of which he 
addressed: Laos, Cuba, Berlin, and Vietnam. At the time of his death, the first three had 
been effectively settled, while the fourth was just emerging into prominence. Johnson 
only had one crisis of that magnitude – Vietnam – and in all likelihood his foreign policy 
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as a whole would be judged by how he handled it (as was eventually the case).91 Johnson 
thus was probably less capable of downplaying a loss than Kennedy had been; if he failed 
in his most important foreign policy challenge, his political enemies could easily exploit 
that weakness. All of these conditions together encouraged Johnson to avoid any risk or 
appearance of failure, and to postpone any negative consequences from Vietnam for as 
long as possible if they could not be avoided. He had no reason to try and settle Vietnam 
in a less than satisfactory way before the election, and every incentive not to, if he wanted 
to be reelected in November of 1964. If he decided on either “extreme” choice, either 
escalation or withdrawal, his reelection might depend on postponing it until after the polls 
closed. 
 Additionally, Johnson seems to have been driven by fear of being labeled “soft on 
communism”, a charge that haunted his party throughout the Cold War era since the 
Communist revolution in China in 1949-1950.92 A quick withdrawal from Vietnam might 
have left Johnson open to that charge; his worst nightmare was to be accused of “losing 
Vietnam” like Truman was of “losing China.”93 Specifically, Johnson did not want to be 
seen as having done too little, something that an early evacuation might suggest. 
Johnson’s predecessors had less to be concerned about on this charge. Khrushchev had to 
answer only to the party, not the voters; while being “soft on capitalism” was eventually 
part of his downfall, it was not a serious risk in the early days of his premiership. 
Additionally, by the time of the reversal of Soviet Austrian policy in 1955, there could 
have been little doubt in the minds of even the most die-hard communists that the Soviet 
Union had truly done all it reasonably could do to “save” Austria for their cause. 
Kennedy had probably feared the charge of being “soft on communism” as well, but, due 
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to his handling of the crises in Cuba, Berlin, and Laos, had more secure anti-communist 
credentials than Johnson. Regardless, by 1963 his outstanding reputation in foreign 
policy issues had probably immunized him from that particular concern. 
 The legacy of the Korean War of 1950-1953 provided arguments both for and 
against escalation. In support of military action, Vietnam, unlike Laos, had a concrete 
border along the seventeenth parallel separating the North and South. This border 
provided a clear line behind which the Americans could carry out military action, either 
directly or through the South Vietnamese forces, in support of the government of South 
Vietnam. In Korea, the Chinese had not engaged the American forces directly until the 
United Nations-led troops were well into North Korea; Johnson administration officials 
could expect a similar response in Vietnam. But this similarity with Korea was also an 
argument against military action; the Korean War had been extremely unpopular with the 
American public and any threat of a repeat, even if “done right”, was politically risky. 
Thus, to avoid the risk of infuriating the Chinese, a full scale invasion of North Vietnam 
was not a realistic option, as it had also not been in Austria and Laos. Johnson had the 
option of gradual, almost imperceptible military escalation, as long as it was kept from 
dominating the headlines.94   
 Johnson’s decisions regarding Vietnam generally seem to have consisted of a 
series of considered, calculated risks based on what appeared politically expedient at the 
time. His chief concern seemed to be that Vietnam would be used against him by his 
political opponents in Washington, and that he was far more vulnerable on Vietnam than 
Khrushchev had been on Austria or Kennedy on Laos. The context in which Johnson was 
forced to make those decisions was very different from that in which Khrushchev and 
  
37
Kennedy had helped steer the fates of Austria and Laos. Khrushchev chose to withdraw 
from Austria after the integration of West Germany into NATO threatened his preferred 
settlement on Germany. Kennedy could not justify committing troops to Laos but not to 
Cuba, and Berlin at times overshadowed them both. Johnson, however, only could make 
a stand in Vietnam. This led to the peculiar phenomenon of fighting a war as quietly as 
possible, to avoid being attacked by either the right or the left.95 
Ultimately, the major concession that led to genuine negotiation in Austria and 
Laos never took place in Vietnam. In Austria, the “de-linking” of Austria from Germany 
led to neutralization; in Laos, it was the willingness to negotiate in the presence of an 
imperfect cease-fire. It was these concessions which had paved the way for the 
negotiations in Austria and Laos to reach the point that neutralization was a realistic 
possibility. President Johnson, however, was never willing to make the one concession 
that would have been necessary for negotiations to continue and thus for neutralization to 
enter the third stage: accepting the end of the existence of South Vietnam as an 
independent, anti-communist state. He either failed to understand that the unification of 
Vietnam was not a negotiable point to the North Vietnamese, or he considered it an 
unacceptable condition. Had Johnson been willing to accept the eventual end of South 
Vietnamese independence, neutralization might have been realized. 
 
Conclusion 
 The three stage neutralization process describes a route followed by the Soviets in 
Austria and the Americans in Laos. In both of these situations, unrealistic expectations 
early in the history of the conflict gave way to a willingness to consider compromise, and 
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finally a desire for genuine negotiation and cooperation. The reality of the situation took 
some time to dawn on the weaker superpowers in each case, but the truth eventually 
became apparent. Once the weaker powers realized the fragility of their hold on the 
country in dispute, and saw the need and the form of the concession needed to spark 
negotiations, they both followed it to neutrality. 
 In Vietnam, however, the unrealistic expectations never entirely went away. The 
Johnson administration’s policy seems to have been to stall for as long as possible and 
hope that some other option would arise. With hindsight, it is easy to see that the political 
repercussions of settling for the neutralization of South Vietnam in late 1964 or early 
1965 would have been far less severe than the eventual fallout from escalation. At the 
time, however, the Johnson administration did what seemed to be the course of action 
least likely to cause a political backlash. Johnson was trying to walk a tightrope between 
the legacies of China and Korea, and the fear of falling victim to either trap dominated 
his policy decisions. His main concern was to avoid being blamed for Vietnam like 
Truman had been for either China or Korea. 
 This narrow focus on Asian precedents for Vietnam might have doomed the one 
reasonable hope Johnson had for neutralization, however. By alienating Ho Chin Minh 
early in the process, and doing nothing to heal that rift, the Americans made an 
implacable enemy out of a potential ally. Had the Americans studied the Austrian model 
more closely, they might have realized that there was probably a stable option that they 
could take. The Soviets had sacrificed what they hoped might become a communist 
Austria for a neutralized Austria. Similarly, the Americans could have sacrificed a 
capitalist Vietnam for a unified, probably communist – but neutral – Vietnam. The 
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American insistence on preserving the independence of South Vietnam probably doomed 
the best hope for neutralization. The United States, especially after the death of Diem, 
had no long-time ally that they would be abandoning. A Titoist Vietnam - a neutral, 
communist country, like Tito’s Yugoslavia - was a viable option.96 The Chinese and 
Vietnamese were historically hostile to each other, and the new, unified Vietnam might 
even have hoped to become an American ally in the region. The course taken by the 
Johnson administration, however, focused on short-term political goals rather than the 
long-term effects. Had Johnson and his advisors taken the longer view – and looked more 
carefully at the cases of Austria and Laos – the Vietnam War might have ended nearly a 
decade earlier, before the full-scale escalation of the war began in 1965. 
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